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Antoun Issa

"The role of a writer is not to say what we all can say, but what we are unable to say."
- Anaïs Nin
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What Really Happened Between Putin and Morsi

Posted By antounissa on May 8th, 2013

Nothing seems to be going right for Mohammad Morsi.

With the economy on the brink of collapse, and rising internal anger at his mismanagement, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are probably regretting their rush to be the first to grab power after Mubarak’s downfall. The first successor to Mubarak was always going to be doomed, inheriting a state completely neglected by the tyrant and his ruling clique for three decades.

But there is another aspect to Morsi’s, and by default the Muslim Brotherhood’s, rule that’s proving increasingly evident as their time in power persists: their sheer incompetence.

As noted by Egyptian political analyst Khalil al-Anani, it’s not that the Muslim Brotherhood are Islamist that’s causing the main problems, but the fact that they just have no idea how to run a country — politically, economically, militarily.

The most recent example of this was Morsi’s two-day trip at the end of April to Sochi, in the hope that Russia would be kind enough to give the struggling country a $2 billion loan.

The trip was a disaster for Morsi, who walked in confident that he would secure Russian financial support, only to leave empty handed. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly turned down the loan, prompting Morsi to later back track in a futile face saving attempt and claim he had never requested it in the first place.

So what happened that resulted in a supposedly certain deal collapsing?

Whispers that made it to my ear from a Western diplomatic source reveal that Putin was unimpressed by Morsi’s ignorance and his team’s complete unprofessionalism.

Putin, the diplomat said, often likes to open conversations with visiting delegates by discussing general topics of interest to the other party.

The Russian leader advised his team, prior to meeting Morsi, to discover the Egyptian leader’s general interests. His advisers suggested discussing archaeology as Egyptians tend to have an interest in the subject, due to their own archaeological wonders.

Putin accepted the advice, and proceeded to begin his discussion with Morsi by raising the Mayan civilisation and its wonderful archaeology. Dumbfounded, Morsi appeared confused, and simply had no idea what Putin was talking about. Putin repeated, trying to elaborate on the Mayan civilisation, confused himself as to why this subject was of such difficulty for Morsi to comprehend. The Egyptian leader finally disclosed that he did not know who or what the Mayans were.

Putin, embarrassed and furious, had pretty much made up his mind on Morsi then and there. No $2 billion loan for you. Russian officials, the diplomat added, continued to express their extreme frustration and disbelief at the level of incompetence exhibited by the Egyptian delegation.

Yet another bad day in the office for the Islamist head of state.

Lebanon’s Liberals Must Take Advantage of Orthodox Electoral Law

Posted By antounissa on February 22nd, 2013

Roughly 50 people turned out to protest the proposed Orthodox Gathering’s Electoral Law on Tuesday, which had just won approval from a parliamentary committee earlier that day. The law further entrenches Lebanon’s sectarian political system by restricting voters to electing representatives within their religious sect (Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Shia Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Druze etc.).

In such a tense climate where our neighbour is slowly disintegrating along sectarian lines, Lebanon’s political leaders thought adopting an even more divisive electoral law would calm the hot waters (a no brainer, right?).

Importantly, however, the new uber sectarian law also includes proportionality, and rids Lebanon of its contentious electoral districts, with now only one-district for this tiny mountainous country of 4 million people.

The inclusion of proportionality, ironically, makes it easier for smaller parties and factions of society to get represented in parliament, as noted by political blogger Elias Muhanna in this post in January.

Proportionality essentially means every vote counts, or as summarised on Wikipedia in its most basic form: “if 30% of voters support a particular party then roughly 30% of seats will be won by that party.”

Despite the overt sectarianism the new law espouses, it actually provides secularists, leftists and liberals their first real opportunity to participate in Lebanon’s political system – long suffocated by sectarian elites, factions and warlords.

How can Lebanon not have a political liberal voice?

It is Lebanon’s greatest irony that as the most liberal country in the Arab world, it is one of the few Arab states without proper liberal, secular or leftist representation in its political affairs – in contrast to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Palestine and even Jordan and Kuwait.

But what are Lebanon’s secular options for like-minded voters in the current political landscape?

  • Traditional secular parties: SSNP, Communists – remnants of an old Lebanese political order, and although they had popular appeal pre-1975, they’re highly unlikely to gain much traction in today’s fight for the secular vote.
  • Recent secular parties: FPM, FM – while the two parties offered hope for a fresh secular approach to Lebanese politics (the FPM in particular), both have been swallowed up by the sectarian ambitions of their leaders, and indeed the sectarian nature of the political system. The FPM, which championed the secular banner in Lebanon only 8 years ago, was the main force behind the most sectarian electoral law yet.

Not much on offer for secular hopefuls in Lebanon, it seems.

Outside of the traditional political class is a small, but eager civil society that is scrambling to find a way to transform its rampant activism into concrete political action. These include the likes of Take Back Parliament, initiatives by leading feminist activist Nadine Moawad, among others.

In addition, there has been an increase in workers strikes, one of which is currently ongoing, and a push for unions to re-enter the political landscape, the most high profile of which was the case with the Spinneys supermarket chain last year.

The new proposed electoral law, which is still to be voted on by parliament, provides an opportunity to these fringes to push for the political and economic change they have been demanding.

And now comes the most difficult process: transforming from a protest movement against the system, to using the system to achieving your goals.

The 50 that protested and blocked a road in Downtown Beirut on Tuesday are the same 50 you would normally find at most pro-secular rallies. You can also spot many of them in cafés and bars in Hamra and Achrafieh, railing about all the injustices prevalent in Lebanon.

Failed secular movement – so far

Eight years since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, which seemingly rejuvenated Lebanese politics with the withdrawal of Syrian forces, Lebanon’s secular movement has failed to make inroads among the Lebanese public, or gain any wide appeal, even among the youth.

Indeed, if you followed Lebanon via Twitter, you would get an entirely different impression. Liberals love Twitter, but acquiring thousands of followers in North America, Europe or other parts of the Arab world still translates to zero political influence in Lebanon.

Unfortunately, Lebanon’s secular activism is restricted to an elite of enthusiastic, educated individuals that are too connected to social media and too disconnected from the realities and concerns of everyday Lebanese.

This disconnect was not made more evident than this week, when two simultaneous protest movements that should be coordinating together were miles apart. Hundreds of public employees have been on strike for days, shutting down government offices, but not a single workers movement representative was present at Tuesday’s secular rally pioneered by liberal activists.

And we return to the age old problem facing secularists: liberalism vs socialism – can they work together?

Liberals too Western, not enough Lebanese

Lebanon’s liberals have done an excellent job at promoting rights-based discourse in the country. Women’s rights, gay rights, and domestic workers rights now make their way into mainstream Lebanese media courtesy of the tireless efforts of liberal activists and civil society. But it is significant to note that this rights-based approach to addressing Lebanon’s woes is an adaptation of Western liberalism, and not necessarily mindful of local challenges. Adopting a Western liberal narrative to a non-Western context always has an air of arrogance and naivete.

This was made clear in the secular rally on Tuesday when young activists were calling for the downfall of the sectarian system, instead of developing strategies to push the secular agenda in a sectarian society. Blind calls against the system fail to acknowledge Lebanon’s present reality: it is a sectarian state, and its society is incredibly sectarian, regardless of the historical justifications for its emergence. The sectarian system won’t disappear because 50 activists blocked a road in Downtown Beirut demanding as such, and neither will it fall on the heels of a rights-based approach to addressing Lebanon’s problems.

What are urgently needed are a reassessment of the secular strategy in Lebanon, and a merger of this strategy with the pressing needs of ordinary Lebanese. While gay rights and domestic workers rights are indeed important, a poor father in Hermel or in Safarand is not going to respond to the needs of homosexuals or domestic workers when he stresses 12-16 hours a day on how to feed his family in the evening.

Lebanon’s sectarian powers succeed in this regard where secular, liberal hopefuls glaringly fail: connecting to the needs of the people (albeit in a corrupt and abusive manner). While liberal activists wave banners for domestic workers, the sectarian powers in this country continue to weave their patronage networks to ensure the masses remain under their thumbs. The masses are not going to rise up against the hands that feed them. Bridging this tremendous gap between Lebanon’s liberals and the masses it purports to represent is the first essential step towards achieving secularism in this country.

Removing the air of Beirut elitism is perhaps one good initial step at achieving this. Last summer’s burning tyres protests were yet another example of how disconnected Beirut’s urban liberals are from the needs of the country’s masses. Protesters frequently blocked major highways and roads last summer across the country in protest at continued long electricity cuts, leaving many to suffer in the sweltering heat. Instead of joining in sympathy with such protests, Beirut’s secular urbanites largely scolded and dismissed the protesters as a public nuisance in typical elitist fashion.

If liberals really hope to produce a secular system in Lebanon, then it must reconnect with Lebanon and the needs of the Lebanese people (which involves work outside of Twitter). Giving the public workers currently on strike a call is probably a good start.

Pics from deadly Beirut bombing plus analysis

Posted By antounissa on October 19th, 2012

I arrived about 30 minutes after the blast, took the following pics. Latest info is that among the dead was head of Lebanon’s Information Security Branch Wissam al-Hassan.

No doubt fingers will be pointing at Syria. Lebanon’s security branch is essentially Sunni dominated with deep ties to Saudi intelligence. Hassan is a renowned opponent of the Syrian regime, and was allegedly behind the arrest of Assad’s key ally in Lebanon, Michel Samaha.

Syrian regime strikes back?

Logic says that the Syrian regime was most likely behind this, a warning to its opponents in Lebanon and their benefactors (read Saudi Arabia) that it still has the power to strike in this country if its interests are threatened.

Memo from Assad to Riyadh: back off from Lebanon or I’ll get dirty.

I don’t expect, however, this to degenerate any further. Amid current reports of protests in north Lebanon and the blocking of the Chtaura-Zahle highway, I still expect things to calm down.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have previously indicated they want Lebanon to remain quiet for now, and Hezbollah has been working around the clock to ensure there isn’t a sectarian spillover from Syria.

Saudi won’t enter a tit-for-tat with Assad in Lebanon, and will calm its Sunni proxies while it focuses on the Turkish border and the rebels inside Syria.

Also, despite this being a sign of Assad’s ability to strike in Lebanon, the Syrian regime does not have the resources to fight a civil war in Lebanon and Syria at the same time. In short, none of the major regional powers want a civil war in Lebanon … for now.

Assad must turn words into action

Posted By antounissa on June 23rd, 2011

My latest piece on the unfolding crisis in Syria, published on ABC’s The Drum.

In his first speech in two months, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad once again vowed political reforms while emphasising the need to combat outlaws and extremists.

Assad’s third speech since the Syrian revolt began was perhaps the first real sign that the president sought to empathise with, what he deemed, “legitimate” concerns of protesters. In contrast to previous speeches that were laden with foreign conspiracy theories, Assad toned down the accusations of a US-Israeli plot to destabilise the country, and appeared to address his people directly.

Assad proposed the creation of committees that would investigate the implementation of a new multi-party law and begin a national dialogue with opposition groups. The president also lambasted the country’s high levels of corruption, opened the door to a possible new constitution, and warned of an economic collapse in the wake of the unrest.

A failure to offer specifics of such reforms, however, has left many Syrians righteously sceptical. Within hours of Assad’s speech, protests erupted in the cities of Latakia, Hama, and several suburbs of Damascus.

A multi-party system was first proposed by the regime as a possible reform at the beginning of the protests in March. A month later, Syria lifted a 48-year-old emergency law, only to intensify an army crackdown that the opposition claims has killed over 1,400 people, with approximately 10,000 detained.

The concern for Syrians, and indeed the world, is that Assad’s words appear to contrast sharply with the actions of the state.

As he spoke, Syrian forces continued its operation in the north-west of the country, surrounding villages in order to re-impose control over the restive border region.

The Turkish Red Crescent claims as many as 30,000 Syrian refugees have fled into Turkey, with more still stranded in makeshift camps on the Syrian side of the border.

The week-long military crackdown in the north-west, beginning in the village of Jisr al-Shughour, has sparked an international outcry, including an impromptu visit to Turkey’s Syrian refugee camps by Hollywood star Angelina Jolie.

While refugee accounts speak of unbridled brutality on the part of the Syrian army and a pro-regime Alawite militia, the Shabiha, conflicting reports have emerged of armed groups killing scores of soldiers.

The media blackout in Syria has made it nearly impossible to verify accounts of atrocities, and thus the picture of what is really occurring remains blurry.

Following days of clashes in Jisr al-Shughour, Turkish journalists were allowed access to the village, discovering a story that differed from the accounts of refugees who had crossed the border.

Turkey’s Todays Zaman reports of a town that reeked of blood and smoke, with fresh bodies of scores of beheaded soldiers littered throughout. One soldier’s decapitated head was allegedly paraded around the village by armed opposition militias.

US reports of armed opposition groups in Syria’s north-west have also emerged, with a US official confirming to the New York Times the existence of several, unknown, religious-based militias fighting the Syrian regime.

“We see the elements of an armed opposition across Syria. In the north-west, we see it as having taken over. There are a lot of them.”

It remains unclear who these militias are, and from where they are sourcing their weapons. Islamist roots of such groups are likely, given Jisr al-Shughour’s history as a conservative Sunni village that has long opposed the Assad regime.

Indeed, the village was the source of an Islamist insurgency against the regime of Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, in the 1980s.

Both sides appear to be competing for a victim status to justify their own militant actions. The opposition’s inability to reign in armed Islamist groups is providing ammunition to Assad’s rhetoric that an overthrow of his government will lead to chaos.

Assad is particularly stoking the fears of minority Christians, Druze and Alawites – to which his family belongs – of a Sunni Islamist coup driven by revenge and Sharia Law as a means to ensure their support.

In yesterday’s speech, Assad again reinforced the threat of extremist Islamist elements within the country bent on imposing its will upon Syria.

The presence of such armed groups in north-west Syria validates Assad’s warnings, and denies the secular opposition the ability to convince wayward Christians and Alawites to join their struggle.

The Islamist threat is also proving effective in restraining the US from openly declaring the removal of Assad from power. Washington is equally wary of the fragility of Syria’s opposition, and while it is increasing pressure on the regime, it is still maintaining a safe distance to not push Syria into a civil conflict with an Islamist insurgency.

As the US winds down its own operations against Islamist insurgents in neighbouring Iraq, it can ill afford to allow an opening for Al Qaeda and Sunni Islamists in Syria, where Sunnis constitute a majority.

Mounting Western and Turkish pressure on the Syrian regime is more a source of frustration at Assad’s stubborn mismanagement of the crisis, as opposed to any genuine desire to see him overthrown.

Following the traditional path of most autocrats, Assad foolishly believes violence will save his authoritarianism. It appears the Syrian leadership has learnt little from the examples of Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Gaddafi. Ruling over a restive population that considers a dictator’s rule illegitimate is doomed for failure. A violent crackdown may buy Assad some time, but the damage to his own credibility as a viable leader is almost irreparable.

Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak best summarised this view by predicting Assad would only survive a further six months given that he has lost all credibility.

The violent government crackdown has only heightened sectarian tensions between majority Sunnis and the ruling Alawites. With every Sunni protester killed, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist armed groups recruit a dozen more.

Extreme situations are prime recruiting grounds for extremist movements.

To the frustration of Turkey, Assad’s continued violent path is a self-destructive road that will only lead to the downfall of his regime, and Syria. One crucial omission from Assad’s speech was that his own authoritarianism is the key obstacle to the development of Syria.

Few expect a dictator to place the interests of his nation above that of his personal power, but Assad’s blind pursuit of the latter will not save his regime, and only condemn Syria to an unstable future riddled in sectarianism.

Despite the genuine intentions of several within the opposition camp, including human rights activists and secular intellectuals, its inability to prevent the emergence of armed Islamist groups speaks volumes of its fragility. If the opposition cannot reign in Islamist groups in battle with the regime, there is little chance such groups would be stopped should Assad’s regime fall.

International efforts also cannot be relied upon, with Russia and China determined to stop a Libya repeat passing through the UN Security Council.

All the more reason why Assad must act on his promises. If the Syrian leader is to have a political future in Syria and save his country from civil war, he must implement the reforms he has promised. Assad needs to stomach the difficult pill that the reign of autocracy in the Arab world is ending.

There are, thus, only two options for the Syrian president: lead the change, or be swept up in it.

Democracy’s price may be too high in Syria – further comments

Posted By antounissa on April 15th, 2011

I wrote a piece on Syria’s recent turmoil that was picked up by ABC’s The Drum.

Judging by some of the comments at the end of the piece, it appears my article has been misconstrued by some.

Of course, in an ideal world, we want every nation to be democratic, and every human being to enjoy the same basic rights and opportunities that many in the West take for granted.

But let’s not be naive about this.

Prosperity does not appear overnight. It is not simply a matter of removing a dictatorship today, and installing robust democratic institutions tomorrow.

Democracy is a concept that that bestows sovereignty onto a people, and actively engages citizens in the decisions and interests of the state.

However, for such a concept to work, it must be agreed upon and adhered to by all major stakeholders within a society.

I can make a broad statement and claim that in troubled post-colonial societies democratic uprisings often lead to a bloodbath.

I can particularly make the statement in regards to the Fertile Crescent states, chiefly Lebanon-Syria-Iraq, all of which are multi-ethnic and confessional states. Indeed, all three had boundaries imposed on them by the Allies post-World War I that until today many within their respective countries do not agree with.

My article highlighted such divisions that have deep historic roots, and to get a better insight into the implications of Syria’s recent history on today’s revolt, see Joshua Landis’ analysis.

Iraq and Afghanistan are clear examples of Western naivete when it concerns state building. You cannot just walk in, remove an authoritarian regime, and install a completely new and unique system and expect it to work without a few glitches (or in Afghanistan’s case, complete failure).

At present in the Middle East, there are notable and encouraging differences that I have highlighted in a previous piece on The Drum. Democracy has to come from within, and indeed, the latest push for democracy in the Arab world is coming from within. This must be praised, and I have, and continue to support their democratic aspirations.

But if Iran 1979 also taught us, we need to be cautious. There is no doubt that long-time human rights activists in Syria are increasingly vocal about change, and are risking their lives at the forefront of the protests. However, as illustrated in my article, there are elements within Syria that are able and willing to hijack any attempt for true democratic change, and are prepared to risk internal conflict to achieve it.

We have witnessed this with armed gangs, the arrests of Khaddam’s men, confessions that certain actors are attempting to arm rebels, and unfortunately for well-meaning protesters, there’s always the lingering presence of the Muslim Brotherhood that taints the image.

This is not to excuse the government’s actions, they have been reprehensible, I have been highly critical over the years of the lack of progress to reform Syria. I have always believed Bashar al-Assad has had many opportunities to open Syria up, and he has implemented several economic reforms, but not enough to prevent Syria from potential economic collapse in the near future.

As a Lebanese, and someone that recognises the indestructible bonds (to the resentment of some Lebanese) between Lebanon and Syria, there is nothing I want to see more than Syria to be democratic, prosperous, and economically healthy. A healthy Syria equals a healthy Lebanon, it is in our interest to see Syria progress.

Conversely, nothing will harm Lebanon more than civil conflict in Syria, and whilst we must remain adamant in our push for reform in Syria, we must also be wary of the dangers such a push poses. The coin can flip either way, and that is exactly what my piece set to highlight.

Ideals and interests coalesce in Libya

Posted By antounissa on April 4th, 2011

My piece in Online Opinion on the notion of legitimate foreign intervention, case study: Libya.

Libya is not Iraq

Posted By antounissa on March 22nd, 2011

For some, Western intervention in Libya is the nail in the coffin of the Libyan Revolution.

It has been contended that this no longer a domestic uprising, but a war that now includes foreign powers with a set of interests at the forefront.

Maximilian Forte, for example, claims that the Libyan rebels have erroneously surrendered their revolution to the West by requesting military intervention.

Forte, echoing a regular argument of anti-Imperialist Leftists, highlights Western hypocrisy in selectively choosing which conflicts to intervene in.

Whilst Sarkozy, Cameron and Obama beat the drums of humanitarianism, evoking the “responsibility to protect” slogan in justifying their intervention in Libya, there remains a plethora of conflicts and human rights abuses both past and ongoing that have received the West’s cold shoulder. Forte mentions Uzbekistan 2005, whose dictator brutally killed hundreds of his own people in a crackdown on opponents, but received little reprimand as he enjoys the special status of being a close and crucial US ally.

The list can go on, from Israel and Bahrain to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Western intervention depends entirely on which side of the fence you sit on in international relations and a cost-benefit analysis.

However, left-leaning supporters of the Western strikes in Libya do not discount Western hypocrisy. No one expects the US or the EU to strike Israel the next time the Jewish state decides to kill 1,000+ Palestinian or Lebanese civilians.

Rather, the focus is not necessarily on the actions of the West, but that of Gaddafi and the pro-democratic movement in the Arab world.

Gaddafi is a brutal dictator, as repressive as all authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. Indeed, I will not cry if the King of Saudi Arabia fell tomorrow in a wave of pro-democracy protests. However, neither will I mourn the loss of Assad of Syria or Gaddafi, despite what some would deem admirable and audacious foreign policies that have been confrontational to global powers.

Anti-Imperialist Leftists are quick, and right, to accuse the West of hypocrisy, but are we not also hypocrites if we pick and choose which dictators should stay and go?

Do Assad and Gaddafi win extra points for standing up to the West (although Gaddafi has recently changed his tune)?

No, they do not.

This strikes at another core argument of the anti-Imperialist Left, which is that much of the Arab world’s stagnation is due to Western – American in particular – interference in the region.

The West indeed has its fair share of responsibility when it comes to the failure of the Arab world to develop post-Cold War along the lines of East Asia or Latin America. However, one cannot ignore agency, and the role it plays in determining the shape of the region. This is particularly true of the few regimes in the region that have chosen to compete with American regional interests, and are thus not contingent on them.

The US may have leverage over Saudi Arabia and Morocco (and even that is questionable), but very little over Syria, Libya and Iran. The Assad regime does not require approval from Washington to embark on internal democratic and economic reform.

Instead of being a pioneer for change and progress in the region, the Syrian regime has benefited from a US-backed regional system of despots to solidify and justify his own power in Syria.

Thus, whether democratic reform is pushed in Egypt, or Syria, or Libya, it matters little to those who are vociferous in their support for change in the region.

Western powers may pick and choose which reformist movements they intend to support, but that luxury is not available to human rights activists. For to be a human rights activist, we recognise the aspirations of all suppressed peoples in the world to enjoy the same democratic freedoms, with the same opportunities as a citizen of the UK or Norway.

Western political support for the Libyan rebels does not negate our support for the same team. The role left-leaning activists have to play is to ensure the Libyan Revolution does not become hijacked by the West. Indeed, there are strong arguments within the military camp of the US that equally do not wish to be burdened by another Middle Eastern conflict.

This is a case of ideals and interests converging in support of action in Libya.

Forte claims the Libyan Revolution is dead and dusted as a consequence of military action. What he fails to acknowledge is that Gaddafi was a few hours away from not only destroying the Libyan Revolution, but empowering dictators in the region to do the same.

The pro-democracy momentum would have evaporated across the region had Gaddafi been allowed to enter Benghazi, but seeing Western powers react has inspired suppressed Syrians, for example, to challenge their own authorities.

The revolution can only be claimed dead if the West take charge of the revolt, which by all indications, they are reluctant to do. The Libyan rebels need to ensure they remain the face of the revolution.

The role of local dissidents is crucial to ensure Libya does not turn into an Iraq. Many have made a false analogy between Libya 2011 and Iraq 2003. Bush’s invasion of Iraq was an entirely external attempt to impose democracy on a foreign country alien to the concept. The entire project was initiated, drafted and implemented by the Bush administration.

A system imposed on another state and society, with little involvement from domestic agents, is often doomed for failure.

Ironically, Assad accurately argued at the time that democracy has to emerge from within the Arab world, not from abroad. And that is exactly what is occurring today, and it is an important distinction that needs to be recognised.

The Libyan people initiated the call for change, and by their own blood attempted to take Gaddafi down. This is entirely their project, it is the emergence of a democratic movement from within Libyan society.

The West’s role in the current situation is not to reset such a drive, and replace it with its own agenda, but to ensure the challenge does not lose momentum. Of course, the French may have a hidden agenda in acquiring a greater slice of Libyan oil, and no one assumes the West is not intervening for certain interests of its own. However, if the pursuit of such interests empowers the Libyan Revolution – not undermine it – then it is a win-win for all, perhaps an uncomfortable reality for some in the Left and Right.

Why I support military intervention in Libya

Posted By antounissa on March 20th, 2011

Western military intervention in Libya has caused rumblings within the Left, as Mark Bahnisch and Guy Rundle have noted.

Anti-Imperialist Leftists remain adamant in their opposition to the imposed Libyan No Fly Zone, with the usual arguments that such action equates to aggression, and not revolution.

Liberal Leftists – those that believe human rights supercedes the sanctity of a state’s sovereignty – are clearly supportive of the intervention on humanitarian grounds, and in sympathy with the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. The latter also fits neatly with traditional right-wing values, in addition to knocking out an old foe in Colonel Qaddafi.

And thus my Twitter has become polarised between left-leaning activists of the two opposing views.

However, whilst I am supportive of intervention on humanitarian grounds, the anti-Imperialist contention that Great Powers only ever intervene when it serves their national interest – and are often entirely cynical of such measures as a consequence – holds some merit. It reflects a realist and pessimistic view of world affairs where humanity simply has no role in international relations,  and state decisions are calculated purely on self interest.

Indeed, one can see a plethora of Western interests at play in Libya:

Oil – that lucrative black resource that the West can’t get enough of. World energy supplies are becoming less available to Western markets as emerging powers demand sufficient oil imports to support their growing economies. Much of Libya’s oil reserves lie in the east of the country, where the West has drawn the red line for Qaddafi. Will they exploit Libya’s wealth, even if it means a long-term division of the country?

Qaddafi - No friend of the West, and an erratic figurehead leads to unpredictable behaviour. When sovereignty rests with a sole leader, the importance of the personality of such a leader magnifies in determining that state’s policies and behaviour in the international community. Think Kim Jong-il.

Replacing Qaddafi with a stable form of governance that the West can rely on will ensure smooth relations, and a steady and secure flow of oil without the threat of an eccentric dictator changing tune at the flick of a switch.

Legitimacy – Following the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the subsequent decline of US global power, legitimate intervention in Libya via the UN and in the name of humanitarianism is a significant step towards regaining global legitimacy. Much political analysis has foreseen the decline of the West in international relations. As emerging powers push forward competing foreign policy agendas, the West’s flexibility to operate as a world’s policeman – as it has for the past four centuries – is curtailed.

A demonstration of military power and projection, whilst upholding liberal democratic values to justify its intervention, signals that the West is still determined to ensure its values define the norms of 21st century international relations.

Nevertheless, with such interests in mind, it is necessary to redress the pessimistic realism that anti-Imperialists often seek to draw upon to justify their cynicism of military action.

The argument that states function purely on national interest is one that is accepted across most international relations theorists. However, what determines such interests is often a source for contention. Anti-Imperialists and realists each assume that national interests are a given for every state, and thus all pursue the same goals (greater power) in the same manner, if given the opportunity.

I do not share such a reductionist view of international affairs. National interests vary considerably between states, and are often contingent on the identities within the state, and thus, the domestic arena plays a significant role in determining the shape and behaviour of a state.

Universal values underpin Western societies. The age-old Christian notion that one must help a man in need lies at the heart of Western thought, even if – admittedly – Western policies seldom reflect such compassion.

That such a conscience exists, however, incredibly influences how the West perceives its role in the world. Whilst many rightly label the West as hypocrites for their inconsistent approach to human rights, it is also true that the West’s self-perception of holding superior moral values grants it – in the West’s views – the legitimacy to police a world where its values are not entirely shared. In 19th century terms, it is the distinction between the civilised, the barbarian and the primitive. The West still retains this view – although in less direct terms – of the world, and adjusts its policies accordingly. The Arab world is still the barbarian other in need of further civilising.

This may appear, and for many it is, a racist outlook. But – and this is entertaining right-wing thought – do we not consider the Western form of governance that upholds the liberal democratic values of freedom of speech superior to the repressive dictatorships of China, Iran and Libya? Does the West still have the right to retain such a distinction between itself and the world, thus giving it the legitimacy it is using today to intervene in Libya?

Indeed, if we are to accept that national interests determine state behaviour, we must also be open to the domestic agents and identities that determine such interests, for the state system is not filled with like-units.

Whilst, yes, the West will intervene in Libya for the benefit of its resources, it is equally simplistic to ignore a humanitarian imperative that lies within the West’s identity and image. That is, the legitimacy the West awards itself, courtesy of its self-perceived view of holding the higher moral ground vis-a-vis other states for the reasons aforementioned.

Libya is a rare case of the Left and Right aligning in pursuit of the same goal: to remove a repressive dictatorship to permit the emergence of a revolutionary liberal democratic Libya that respects human rights. It is the unique occasion where Western ideals and interests coalesce to enable an intervention without much dissent and soul-searching, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Indeed, enthusiasts in both camps believe that such an approach should be extended to the Gulf, where Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia deploy similar brutal measures to contain pro-democracy protests.

However, where ideals and interests clash, one can expect the West to shelve its rhetoric to safeguard core interests. The Gulf is simply too precious and fragile to tinker with. Intervening in the Gulf is not a question of Western legitimacy, but of Western capability. Can the US – in particular – cope with a revolution in the Gulf? If Egypt is any indication, it would seem not.

Failure to support the democratic uprisings in the Gulf is more a signal of America’s declining ability to influence states to accede to its interests.

But if we can take one, Libya, then it is better than none.

Al Jazeera Listening Post: Libya

Posted By antounissa on February 27th, 2011

On the Listening Post again, discussing Libya. Our segment starts at 8m15s.

Although the media coverage on Libya has been substantial, both in the West and the Arab world, it’s still incredibly difficult getting the stories out from the ground. We don’t have the continuous footage that came out of Egypt or Tunisia. Most of what we’re receiving – social and traditional media – is from improvised technology (video phone recordings) and word of mouth on Twitter.

Libya is a relatively closed society, and we had similar difficulties getting accurate details of what was transpiring on the ground in the Burma protests of 2007.

The camera is a powerful tool that can constrain forces of belligerence simply through the outrage images of carnage causes around the world. It’s often said that if we had the communications technology in the 1940s that we do today, 60 million people probably wouldn’t have been killed.

Gaddafi has effectively shut out the media. Yes, we’re receiving the sporadic YouTube clips and images on Twitter, but none of it is all that coherent. We still have no real idea of the death toll, we’ve heard over 1000, we’ve heard several thousand. Massacres take place when the cameras aren’t watching, and I fear we will be discovering many corpses when the Gaddafi nightmare is over.

Arabs no longer an exception

Posted By antounissa on February 8th, 2011

My two cents on the Arab revolution sweeping from Tunis to Cairo, and hopefully beyond, published on the ABC’s Unleashed:

With Egypt on the cusp of a democratic revolution, it is clear to the world that the Arabs are finally having their awakening. This decade will mark a significant change to the post-colonial Middle Eastern order that has stagnated the region for much of the past century.

The Arab ‘street’, which has been sidelined in the political life of these countries by decades of autocracy, is about to take charge in determining the interests of their states.

As a generation of tweeters take to the streets of Egypt in a bid to oust their dictator, President Hosni Mubarak, it is fair to deduce that globalisation has at last reached the shores of the Middle East.

‘Arab exceptionalism’ no more

The democratic wave that swept through Eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia post-Cold War failed to dint the authoritarian landscape in the Arab world. Rather, Arab regimes tightened their autocratic rule when the world was heading in an opposite direction.

Discourse on globalisation and development, thus, largely bypassed the Arab world. It became widely anticipated that the Assads, Mubaraks and Abdullahs of the region would continue their dynastic rule by gifting their rule to their progeny.

‘Arab exceptionalism’ was a phrase coined to normalise the region’s autocracy and lack of development, and justify the failure of globalised trends to penetrate the Middle East. Adherence to this perception of the Arab world blinded many to the realities on the ground, and consequently caused shock in the West and Israel when millions began pouring onto the streets of Cairo to demand Mubarak’s resignation.

Indeed, a week prior to the beginning of the Egyptian protests, Israel’s head of military intelligence Major General Aviv Kochavi was certain on the stability of the Mubarak regime.

Global communications

Albeit dormant, the Arab ‘street’ was not totally immune to the effects of globalisation. Despite living in heavily censored states, young Arabs connected to the World Wide Web and discovered a means to challenge the status quo. Social media – a global phenomenon of Facebook, Twitter and blogging – pierced the tightly held information censorship bubbles of the Arab world, and enabled locals to air their frustrations in an open space.

Popular Facebook pages were up a week earlier informing Egyptians of mass protests, a date was chosen, a Twitter hashtag was selected, and before you knew it, tens of thousands were in the streets.

This is not to detract from the core elements of the protests. Indeed, like most revolutions, Egyptian grievances are found in poverty, unemployment, and a lack of freedoms. Social media and the internet, however, have provided Egyptians and Arabs with a means in which to communicate such grievances, exchange ideas, and aid in collective action.

Internet is for Arabs what cafés were for the French in 1789, an open space where aggrieved citizens can share their frustrations and work together towards an alternative. Social media did not cause the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, but it facilitated them.

Globalised ideals

The use of the internet and social media is not the only indication of the effects of globalisation on the Middle East. Protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan are all chanting the same demand: democratic reform.

A globalised ideal that has made its way to all corners of the world is now on the lips of Arab protestors. Liberal democracy – a concept championed by the US seemingly everywhere but the Middle East – has been touted as the preferred alternative to authoritarianism.

In an era where the West feared an Islamist takeover of the region, that protestors are chanting for democracy should be a sign of comfort. Islamism infers that Arabs are still exempt from the global system, and are opting to pursue an antagonistic form of governance. However, the calls for democracy in Cairo and Tunis demonstrate an eagerness from the Arab ‘street’ to join the global system, and begin to receive the economic benefits promised by liberal democracy.

Indeed, liberal democratic reforms also include a redefinition of a nation’s interests. Sovereignty in the Arab world has long been confined to the selfish interests of despotic ruling families. This proved much easier for the US to manage in terms of finding allies to support its regional interests, such as containing Iran and protecting Israel.

Democracy, conversely, bestows sovereignty onto the people, and thus – as we understand from our own democratic traditions – the national interest becomes a complex and fluid concept driven by altering attitudes within the public.

At present, the Arab public remains hostile to Israel, and ambivalent towards Iran, and this poses a short-term dilemma for Washington. Long-term gains, however, outweigh any short-term costs, with a democratic and developing Arab world moving with the globalisation process and not against it. The social and economic pressures brought by despotic, corrupt rule will alleviate, and radical religious extremists will have a smaller pool of frustrated, impoverished youth to recruit from.

Using globalised means of communication to promote a globalised political system, Arabs have proven that they are no longer an exception.